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COPYRIGHT LAW AND FACTUAL WORKS-Is RESEARCH PRO-
TECTED?-Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th
Cir. 1981).*
Gene Miller, a reporter for the Miami Herald, collaborated with a kid-
napping victim in writing the book 83 Hours Till Dawn. The book de-
tailed the victim's experience of being placed in a coffin-like container
and buried alive in the Georgia woods for five days. Universal City Stu-
dios negotiated with Miller to purchase the movie rights to the work, but
no agreement was reached. Nevertheless, Universal produced and aired a
television movie about the kidnapping. Miller brought an action alleging
that Universal's making of the movie infringed his copyright in the book.
The trial court instructed the jury that, while facts cannot be copyrighted,
an author's research of factual matters is copyrightable. I
In Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,2 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that research is not copyrightable. The court
based its holding on the copyright distinction between facts and ideas,
which do not receive copyright protection, and the expression of facts or
ideas, which does.3 It reasoned that the research upon which Miller based
his book more closely resembled unprotected "facts" than protected
"expression. "4
The court attempted to reconcile the maxim that facts and ideas are not
protected by copyright with the longstanding limited protection granted to
directories composed exclusively of facts. 5 It suggested that a copyright
in a directory does not protect an author's research in producing the work,
but rather rests upon the arrangement or selection of facts contained
therein. 6 Alternatively, it stated that protection for directories may be
considered an anomaly, made possible by their inclusion within the scope
of the Copyright Act.7
* A slightly different version of this piece is entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition
at the University of Washington and in the national competition. The Burkan Competition is spon-
sored by the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers.
1. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984, 987 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 650
F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
2. 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
3. See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
4. 650 F.2d at 1372.
5. See, e.g., Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Indep. Directory Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Ark. 1974). The
directory cases are instructive in understanding Miller because they concern works in which research
is the most important original contribution of authors. See infra part IVA.
6. 650 F.2d at 1369-70.
7. Id. at 1370. Directories are compilations and thus are included under the Copyright Act. 17
U.S.C. app. §§ 101, 103 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). They were expressly listed as copyrightable sub-
ject matter under the current statute's predecessor, the Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §
5(a), 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (1909).
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This Note first reviews traditional copyright protection theory. It then
discusses the application of copyright principles to factual works 8 em-
bodying the product of research. It concludes that the Miller court's hold-
ing that research is not copyrightable may be used to deny effective pro-
tection to works that embody little or no "expression." The Note
proposes that copyright law should protect the most important stratum of
original contribution contained in a work, and suggests that the strata ap-
proach provides a framework that avoids existing inconsistencies and af-
fords effective protection to all authors.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The History, Purpose and Scope of Copyright Law
The Constitution authorizes Congress "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts" by granting authors limited monopolies in their
works. 9 These monopolies are given in the form of copyrights. Their pur-
pose is to reward authors for their productive efforts and to benefit the
public by encouraging creative efforts in the future. 10
To be copyrightable, a work must be fixed in tangible form, and it must
be original. ' ' A work is fixed in tangible form if it is "sufficiently perma-
nent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
8. For purposes of this Note, "factual works" are works in which facts are represented through
written words. In a broader sense, factual works might also include photographs, maps, charts, and
other works in which facts are represented.
9. The copyright clause grants Congress power "To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . .. the exclusive Right to their. . . Writings." U.S.
CoNsT art. I § 8. Copyright law was first codified in the United States under the Copyright Act of
1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-810 (1976
& Supp. V 1981)). Among the exclusive rights accorded authors of copyrighted works is the right to
reproduce, distribute and adapt those works. 17 U.S.C. app. § 106 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). These
rights are not absolute, however. They are limited, for example, in time, 17 U.S.C. app. § 302 (1976
& Supp. V 1981), and by the fair use doctrine. 17 U.S.C. app. § 107 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
10. The copyright, according to a leading expert, is primarily a utilitarian device to secure the
public benefit derived from intellectual effort and the resulting product. I M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 1.03(A) (1982 revision). The United States Supreme Court has also expressed this
view. "The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in
the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors." Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286
U.S. 123, 127 (1932); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Courts have nonetheless
recognized the author's private interest in copyright. See, e.g., infra notes 24-27 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the tension between public and private interests in copyright, see Esezobor,
Concepts in Copyright Protection, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 258 (1975).
11. "Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device." 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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municated for a period of more than transitory duration." 12 Because en-
couragement of creative endeavor is the goal of copyright law, there is no
reason to copyright non-original works. Nevertheless, the measure and
quality of originality an author must contribute before being entitled to
copyright protection is minimal. "No matter how poor ... the 'author's'
addition, it is enough if it be his own." 13
All components of a work are not protected once a copyright is ob-
tained. 14 For example, copyright does not protect the ideas 15 and facts 16
contained in a copyrighted work. If ideas and facts could be monopol-
ized, the available material upon which authors could freely draw would
be greatly reduced. 17 Also, as the Miller court noted, "a fact does not
originate with the author of a book describing the fact." 18
While copyrights do not protect ideas or facts, they do protect their
"expression." 19 If the expression of facts in a work is sufficiently origi-
nal, it will be protected and may not be duplicated verbatim by a second
author. 20 To establish copyright infringement, an author generally must
show that the copier had access to her work2' and that the copier's work is
"substantially similar" to the expression found in her own work. 22
12. 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976 &Supp. V 1981).
13. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951).
14. For an insightful discussion of copyright considerations affecting the protection given to vari-
ous forms of factual works, see Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation
of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (1963).
15. See 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Accord Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
217 (1954); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487,489 (2d Cir. 1960).
16. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918); Hoehl-
ing v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.- 841 (1980);
Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
17. 1 M. NIMMER. supra note 10, § 1. 10(B)(2). Professor Nimmer has also argued that the facts-
and-ideas/expression dichotomy represents a constitutional balance between copyright policies and
first amendment protection of a marketplace of ideas. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180 (1970).
18. 650F.2dat 1368.
19. E.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). For the purposes of this Note, "expres-
sion" means the original manner in which an author represents ideas or facts in a work.
20. See, e.g., Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977)
(expression of facts in financial reports protected), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Chicago
Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune Ass'n, 275 F. 797 (7th Cir. 1921) (expression of facts in news article
protected). Although facts are not protected, authors may copyright works embodying original repre-
sentations of facts in diverse tangible forms. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,
I ll U.S. 53 (1884) (photographs); Leon v. Pacific Tel. &Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937)
(directories); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp.
198, 201 (D. Mass. 1942) (horse racing charts); Woodman v. Lydiard-Peterson Co., 192 F. 67, 70
(C.C.D. Minn. 1912) (maps), affd., 204 F. 921 (8th Cir. 1913).
21. Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); see generally 3 M. NIMMER. supra
note 10, § 13.02 (discussing proof of access).
22. 3 M. NIMMER. supra note 10, §§ 13.01-.03; see, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360
F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966). Substantial similarity can be demonstrated in two ways: the two
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B. Copyright Protection for Research
Courts disagree as to whether copyright protects research. 23 In Toksvig
v. Bruce Publishing Co.,2 4 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sug-
gested that the research upon which biographical or historical books are
based is protected. In Toksvig, the plaintiff wrote a biography of Hans
Christian Andersen based upon original Danish sources. The defendant
copied general concepts and specific passages from the plaintiff's book in
her own biography of Andersen. 25 The court upheld the plaintiff's claim
of infringement, 26 stating that a second author cannot rely upon proof that
the copied information could have been obtained from the same sources,
but must actually go to the sources and do independent research. 27 Under
the Toksvig court's analysis, a second author must independently confirm
facts uncovered by the first author to avoid infringing the first author's
work concerning the same subject.
Conversely, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals indicated in Rose-
mont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.28 that copyright cannot
protect research. In Rosemont, the plaintiff held the copyrights to several
articles about Howard Hughes that had been published in Look Magazine.
The defendant quoted, copied and paraphrased substantial passages from
the Look articles in a Hughes biography written for Random House. 29 The
works may be generally similar although not verbatim copies, or they may be similar in a fragmented
literal (virtually word-for-word) manner. For a more complete discussion of substantial similarity,
see 3 M. NIMMER. supra note 10, § 13.03.
23. For the purposes of this Note, "research" means the labor expended and expense incurred to
gather and record facts. This definition is consistent with the Miller court's interpretation of research
as meaning the labor, as opposed to the product, of research. See Miller v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369, 1372 (5th Cir. 1981).
24. 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950).
25. Id. at 666.
26. While the court based the defendant's liability on her failure to do independent research, the
large amount of copying, regardless of such failure, may have been a sufficient ground for finding
infringement. See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966)
(discussed infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); cf. Eisen-
schiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.) (no infringement where copying found
insubstantial, even though defendant copied theories and facts discovered by plaintiffs extensive
research), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
27. 181 F.2d at 667. By requiring independent research, the court emphasized the original au-
thor's private interest in copyright. This view grants the copyright holder certain rights by virtue of
the labor expended in creating her work. The Toksvig theory impairs the public interest to the extent
that it requires authors to duplicate research. If protection of expression sufficiently protects an au-
thor's private interest in a work, then the Toksvig approach may conflict with the fundamentally
utilitarian purpose of the copyright. See supra note 10; see also Gorman, supra note 14, at 1582-84
(factual product of historical research not protected under traditional copyright concepts).
28. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
29. Upon motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court found substantial copying of
expression from the Look articles. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 55,
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court expressly rejected the Toksvig approach, 30 allowing use of both re-
search and substantial expression 3' under the doctrine of fair use.32 It con-
cluded that the public's interest in biographical information about public
figures outweighed the plaintiff's interest under its copyright. 33
The Second Circuit followed Rosemont in Hoehling v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.34 The plaintiff in Hoehling wrote an account of the last voy-
age and destruction of the Hindenberg. The project required extensive
research. 35 The defendants' works, a book and a movie about the inci-
dent, allegedly copied Hoehling's theory that the Hindenberg was de-
stroyed by sabotage and duplicated certain facts and sequences of events
from Hoehling's book.36 The court, relying on its decision in Rosemont,
concluded: "In works devoted to historical subjects ... a second author
may make significant use of prior work .... ,,37 The court nevertheless
added an important qualification: the second author may use the prior
work only "so long as he does not bodily appropriate the expression of
another.' '38 Thus, the Second Circuit in Hoehling reaffirmed the Rose-
mont conclusion that research is not protected, while clarifying that sec-
ond authors may not copy expression in substantial quantities.
As in other contexts, original expression is protected in news stories39
61-64 (1966). The district court granted the motion, but the circuit court reversed. Rosemont Enters.,
Inc. v. Random House, Inc. 366 F. 2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
30. "We, however, cannot subscribe to the [Toksvig] view that an author is absolutely precluded
from saving time and effort by referring to and relying upon prior published material." 366 F.2d at
310.
31. See supra note 29. The decision may also have rested on the ground that substantial copying
was not clearly proven for purposes of issuing a preliminary injunction, 366 F.2d at 306, although
reliance upon this rationale would have constituted an implicit reversal of the trial court's finding of
substantial copying.
32. Fair use is a doctrine under which copyrighted material maybe copied without liability. It is
generally considered an affirmative defense to a prima facie showing of infringement. 3 M. NIMMER,
supra note 10, § 13.05. Among the traditional uses of copyrighted material considered "fair use" are
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. 17 U.S.C. app. § 107
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). Purely commercial uses, such as the use in Rosemont, have not been tradi-
tionally sanctioned under the doctrine. See 17 U.S.C. app. § 107(1), (4) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 3
M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.05(A)(4)-(B).
33. 366 F.2d at 307-09. Because the court denied copyright protection to expression under the
guise of the fair use doctrine, its result has been disapproved by the Ninth Circuit. Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1171 n. 17 (9th Cir. 1977).
34. 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
35. 618 F.2d at 975.
36. Id. at 978-79.
37. Id. at 980.
38. Id.
39. The Supreme Court has stated that news articles possessing a "literary quality" are copy-
rightable. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918) (dicta); see also
Inter-City Press, Inc. v. Siegfried, 172 F. Supp. 37, 40-41 (W.D. Mo. 1958) (reproduction of article
presumptively containing original expression held infringement); Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63,
65-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (expression protected, but copying not shown).
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while research is not. For instance, in Chicago Record-Herald Co. v.
Tribune Association,40 the Chicago Herald copied substantial portions of
a copyrighted article first published in the New York Tribune. The court
held that the first article was protected by the copyright laws, insofar as it
involved "authorship and literary quality and style."-4 1 The court noted
that the first article, a description of German submarines, "reveals a pe-
culiar power of portrayal, and a felicity of wording and phrasing." 42 The
Chicago Record-Herald court thus focused on expression and not re-
search as the protected element in news stories. 43 Had the plaintiff's arti-
cle not possessed a distinct literary quality, it would not have been pro-
tected. 44
C. Copyright Protection for Directories
Courts have granted protection to the research required to produce di-
rectories and indexes. 45 In Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,46
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found infringement where the defen-
dants copied the plaintiff's telephone directory. The defendants merely
rearranged the listings from the prior directory by telephone numbers in-
stead of by alphabetized names. The court noted that a compiler of a di-
rectory " 'acquires material of which he is the author. He produces by his
labor a meritorious composition, in which he may obtain a copy-
right.' "47 By stressing the act of acquiring facts and the labor required to
produce a directory, the court isolated research as the basis for copyright
protection in a directory. The court protected the original compiler's re-
search by holding that wholesale copying of the information in a tele-
phone directory constitutes copyright infringement. 48
40. 275 F. 797 (7th Cir. 1921).
41. Id.at798-99.
42. Id. at 799.
43. One commentator has suggested, however, that courts easily find original expression in news
stories because of their underlying concern for the labor and expense in gathering news. Gorman,
supra note 14, at 1578.
44. 275 F. at 798; see also National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294,
297-98 (7th Cir. 1902).
45. See, e.g., Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83, 85 (2d
Cir.). ceri. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Indep. Directory
Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900, 905 (W.D. Ark. 1974).
46. 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937).
47. id. at 486 (quoting Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83.
88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922)).
48. See also Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Bedco of Minn., Inc., 501 F. Supp. 299 (D. Minn.
1980). In Northwestern Bell, the defendant photocopied advertisements from the plaintiff's copy-




The compiler's research was also protected in Schroeder v. William
Morrow & Co.49 In Schroeder, the plaintiff's book listed the names and
addresses of seed and plant suppliers, along with descriptive information
about each supplier. The defendant copied a substantial number of the
names and addresses from the plaintiff's book. 50 The court noted that
" '[a]ppropriation of the fruits of another's labor and skill in order to
publish a rival work without the expenditure of the time and effort re-
quired for independently arrived at results is copyright infringement.' ",51
In finding infringement, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
district court's holding that the plaintiff's copyright protected only de-
scriptive material and not names and addresses. 52
II. THE MILLER DECISION
Gene Miller sued Universal City Studios for copyright infringement,
alleging that Universal had copied material from his copyrighted book, 83
Hours Till Dawn, in producing its movie about the kidnapping depicted in
both works. At trial, significant similarities between the book and the film
were demonstrated, 53 including incorrect facts apparently copied from the
book by Universal's scriptwriter. 54 The judge instructed the jury that re-
search is copyrightable. 55
The jury found that Universal had infringed Miller's copyright and the
district court denied Universal's subsequent motion for a new trial. 56 The
first concluded that such a directory more closely resembled a traditional telephone directory than an
advertising periodical. Id. at 302. It then applied the Leon line of reasoning:
There is nothing that would prevent a subsequent compiler from collecting this information by
independent research, or even from using the copyrighted directory to ascertain the names of
prospective advertisers .... However, "what a subsequent compiler cannot do is copy from an
already copyrighted directory and save himself the labor and expense incurred by the prior com-
piler."
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Indep. Directory Serv.,
Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900, 906 (W.D. Ark. 1974)).
49. 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977).
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id. at 6 (quoting Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co., 301 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 817 (1962)).
52. Id. at 5.
53. In order to prove infringement, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant copied her
work. A necessary element of proof is the substantial similarity of the two works. See supra note 22;
see also Kustoffv. Chaplin, 120 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1941).
54. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984, 985 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 650
F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981). Courts generally regard common error as strong evidence of copying. 3
M. NIMMER. supra note 10, § 13.03(C).
55. 460 F. Supp. at 987.
56. Id. at 988.
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Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 57 holding that the trial court's
instruction that research is copyrightable was erroneous. 58
The court of appeals first considered the traditional distinction between
facts and expression. 59 It noted that one who discovers facts does not
thereby establish an original copyrightable interest, 60 because facts do not
originate with the discoverer. 61 The court concluded that the Rosemont-
Hoehling approach, 62 which protects only expression, was "more consis-
tent with the purpose and intended scope of protection under the copy-
right law" than the Toksvig approach, 63 which also protects research. 64
According to the court, the distinction between facts and expression bal-
ances the public's interest in encouraging creative effort against its need
for access to information and permits use of information without unneces-
sary duplication of effort. 65
Miller relied in part on the directory cases to support his contention that
copyright law protects research. The court found the directory cases diffi-
cult to distinguish adequately. 66 It concluded that copyrights in directo-
ries are based upon original selection and arrangement of facts, not upon
authors' efforts in gathering information. 67 The court alternatively sug-
gested that the directory cases are an anomaly resulting from the inclusion
57. 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
58. Id. at 1368. The court noted that the record contained sufficient evidence to support a finding
of infringement under correct theories of copyright law. The record indicated sufficient similarities
between the plaintiff's and the defendant's works to establish that the defendant copied the plaintiff's
expression. See id. at 1367. The court nevertheless remanded the case because it concluded that the
instruction that research is copyrightable was prejudicial error. Id.
The court's holding that research is not copyrightable was unnecessarily broad. The issue properly
before the court was not copyrightability-the validity of Miller's copyright. Rather, it was whether
the erroneous instruction so misled the jury as to result in an incorrect finding that Universal had
copied protected components of Miller's book, thereby infringing his copyright. The record was clear
that, under traditional analysis, Universal had copied the protected expression in Miller's book.
Therefore, remand of the case was unnecessary. Moreover, the holding that research is not copyright-
able is unclear. Works that are the product of research are copyrightable; the issue is whether a
copyright protects the author's research.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 14-20.
60. 650 F.2d at 1368. The Copyright Act of 1976 clearly says that copyright protection does not
apply to discoveries: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any . . . discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or em-
bodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
61. 650 F.2d at 1368-69.
62. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
63. 650 F.2d at 1371. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
64. 650 F.2d at 1370-72.
65. Id. at 1371-72.




of directories within the Copyright Act of 1909. It noted that protection of
research has not been extended to subject matter such as news articles. 68
III. ANALYSIS
Miller demonstrates that the dichotomy between facts and ideas, on the
one hand, and expression, on the other, is inadequate to encompass the
many types of works, including directories and indexes, currently pro-
tected under copyright law. Its holding that research is not copyrightable
may deny protection to some works in which research is the only original
element. An analytical framework emphasizing protection of the most
important stratum of original contribution in various works would allow
courts to protect research in appropriate circumstances. Under this type of
analysis, Miller is correct in its result, because Miller's book is a factual
work containing recognizable expression, and that expression is the most
important stratum of original contribution. If research had been the most
important stratum, however, the court's statement that research is not co-
pyrightable would have been incorrect.
A. Problems Under Conventional Analysis
The Miller court used the traditional facts-and-ideas/expression dicho-
tomy as a framework for determining which elements of 83 Hours Till
Dawn were protected by copyright. While this approach is appropriate for
works containing expression, it is inadequate for factual works that con-
tain no expression. It is based upon an examination of the end product;
certain intrinsic elements of the work are protected or not protected. Yet,
in some cases, protection of an author's original research in producing
that end product is desirable in light of the copyright function of encour-
aging creative effort. For this reason, courts have considered research as
well as expression in determining which elements are protected by copy-
right. 69
The Miller holding that research is not copyrightable could be used to
deny effective protection to such works as directories and indexes, which
do not contain expression that is simple to identify. To conclude, as did
the Miller court, that copyright protects the original selection or arrange-
ment of facts in directories does not adequately harmonize directory cases
with traditional facts-and-ideas/expression analysis. In the telephone di-
rectory cases, for instance, arrangement of listings alphabetically does
68. Id. at 1370. The court relied upon International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215 (1918). See supra note 39.
69. See supra parts IIB & IIC.
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not seem sufficiently unique to constitute even the minimal "originality"
required under present copyright law. 70 "Names, addresses, telephone
numbers and their patterning in alphabetical order are what they are, inde-
pendent of creative authorship by the compiler. "71 Thus, some other ra-
tionale must be developed for granting copyright protection to works in
which research is the only significant original contribution.
B. Proposed "Strata" Approach
Courts should begin their analysis in copyright infringement cases by
isolating the most important stratum of original contribution in the alleg-
edly infringed works. 72 Protectable strata in factual works are various
levels of original contribution by an author, resulting in progressively
more refined representation of facts. They would range from the simple
gathering, compiling and recording of facts to the expression of facts in,
for instance, unique prose. By protecting the most important stratum,
courts can ensure in each case that some minimum, effective protection is
given to each author. This result is consistent with the underlying pur-
poses of copyright law. 73
Although the strata test requires courts to make a subjective determina-
tion of the "most important" stratum of original contribution in various
kinds of works, that determination may be no more difficult than deciding
what constitutes original "expression." 74 The strata test has the virtue of
directing initial inquiry away from the distinction between ideas or facts
and expression, which is a meaningless distinction when there is no defin-
able original expression in a given work. Instead, the inquiry focuses on
protecting the most significant level of an author's original contribution.
70. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
71. Gorman, supra note 14, at 1584.
72. This strata test was originally suggested for works that defy categorization under specific
tests defining "expression," such as the "pattern" test, which equates expression with the patterning
or ordering of facts or ideas. Gerber, Book Review, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV 925. 961-62 (1979).
Gerber suggests that infringement should be determined only after first isolating the most important
stratum of a work. This method of analysis may be expanded to encompass virtually all works, in-
cluding factual works in which "expression" is an insufficient concept for limiting or defining copy-
right protection.
More than one stratum conceivably could be protected in a single work. This would be true if a
work were divisible into sections containing fundamentally different types of significant original con-
tribution. For example, in Schroeder, discussed supra in text accompanying notes 49-52, expression
in the plaintiff's descriptions of seed and plant suppliers as well as the selection of listed names and
addresses should have been protected. See Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 6 (7th
Cir. 1977).
73. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
74. For a discussion of the difficulty in formulating a single definition of "expression" that can
adequately indicate which elements of a work are protected, see Gerber, supra note 72, at 959-61.
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Copyrighting Research
This is in accord with the policy behind copyright law, which is to en-
courage a broad range of creative endeavor by guaranteeing protection for
the product of such endeavor.
In factual works, the most important stratum of original contribution
may be determined by examining the amount of creative work done by
the author. For example, in historical and biographical books as well as
news stories, the form of expression of both facts and original fictional
elements, if any, would be protected. 75 In works like 83 Hours Till
Dawn, expression is the most important stratum of original contribution
because it is the highest level of refinement in the representation of facts.
Once a court determined that expression was the most important stratum
of a work, only the expression in that work would be protected. Research
would not be protected. 76
In other factual works, the selection and arrangement of facts may be
the most important stratum. This would be the case if an author's work
contained an original selection or arrangement of facts, but was not so
refined as to contain original expression of those facts. 77 The Guinness
Book of World Records is a well-known example of such a work. 78 A
finding of infringement in these works would require that the defendant's
work be substantially similar to the plaintiff's work in its arrangement and
selection of facts. In these works, as in works containing original expres-
sion, an author's research would not be protected.
Finally, in directories and indexes, the only important original contri-
bution of an author might be outside the form of the work itself and con-
sist of the author's original research. 79 Protection of research to some ex-
75. 1 M. NIMMER. supra note 10, § 2.11(B), (C). See also Hoehling y. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.) (expression of historical facts protected), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
841 (1980); De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1944) (fictional elements in a
biographical screenplay protected).
76. Under this approach, the extension of protection in Toksvig beyond the stratum of expression
to that of research would be incorrect. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. On the other
hand, Rosemont would also be incorrect because it arguably denied protection even to expression.
See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 812-13
(7th Cir. 1942) (compilation of choice restaurants); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England
Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198, 201 (D. Mass. 1942) (arrangement of data in racing
forms); see also New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 222 n.2
(D.N.J. 1977) (selection, involving significant subjective judgment, of facts protected); see generally
I M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.1 I(D) (discussing protection for the selection and arrangement of
facts). The current definition of "compilation" in the Copyright Act supports these and similar deci-
sions: "A 'compilation' is a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or
of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship." 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (emphasis
added).
78. 1M. NIMMER,supranote 10, §2.11(D).
79. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
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tent constitutes protection of facts, as the Miller court noted, 80 but such
protection is presently afforded directories. 81 Under a strata analysis, the
Miller court's statement that "[a] copyright in a directory [does not rest]
on the industriousness of the efforts to develop the information" 8 2 would
not be true.
In the cases where protection of research is requested, copyright law
more closely resembles tort law than traditional statutory copyright law.
It has been suggested that in cases like the directory cases, in which re-
search is protected, it might be appropriate to apply the law of unfair
competition. 83 Nevertheless, directories have historically been within the
scope of copyright law. Moreover, copyright protection of research in
such works is consistent with the proposed strata analysis and the copy-
right principles embodied therein.
Copyright protection of research in directories, furthermore, would
typically be fairly limited under the strata approach. First, substantial
similarity 84 must be demonstrated. Second, independent discovery of
facts may not be required to avoid infringement; a second author's mere
verification of the facts contained in the first directory may be sufficient. 85
80. 650 F.2d at 1369.
81. One court has recognized that both labor and selection of facts can constitute separate bases
for copyright protection in factual works. Dow Jones & Co. v. Chicago Board of Trade, 546 F. Supp.
113, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
82. 650 F.2d at 1369.
83. Gorman, supra note 14, at 1571. In International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215 (1918), the plaintiff relied on a theory of unfair competition; its news was not copyrighted. The
court noted that unfair competition involves a quasi-property right between parties competing in a
sphere of business, rather than a right (such as copyright) of a party as against the public. Id. at
236-42. That the law of unfair competition in the realm of intellectual endeavor, however, is rela-
tively undeveloped perhaps explains the general reliance of plaintiffs upon copyright law in directory
cases. See Gorman, supra note 14, at 1571.
84. Cf. supra note 22 (discussing substantial similarity in expression between two works). Be-
cause the theory underlying protection of copyrighted directories is that the second author should not
be allowed to unfairly appropriate the product of the first author's research, substantial similarity in
directory cases should require similarity in use. As a practical matter, copying of the first author's
directory in a substantially similar form will usually correspond to a substantially similar use by the
second author-i.e., the publication of a competing directory.
85. In discussing the extent to which copyright protects research in directories, Judge Learned
Hand noted: "Every one [sic] concedes that a second compiler may check back his independent work
upon the original compilation, but there has been some dispute whether he may use the original
compilation after simply verifying its statements, or whether he must disregard the assistance of the
original, except in subsequent verification." Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publish-
ing Co., 274 F. 932, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), affd, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581
(1922). But see Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Bedco of Minn., Inc., 501 F. Supp. 299, 302 n.2 (D.
Minn. 1980) (questioning the applicability of the no-verification standard to a telephone directory).




In Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that research is not copyrightable. This holding demon-
strates the inadequacies in current copyright law concerning works re-
flecting little original expression, in which research is the primary origi-
nal contribution. By isolating and protecting the most original stratum of
a work, courts could avoid these inadequacies. When the only stratum of
original contribution consists of an author's research in compiling the co-
pyrighted work, a court should protect that stratum, because the lack of
easily definable expression in a work makes the facts-and-ideas/expres-
sion dichotomy inapplicable.
Edwin K. Sato
